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Resisting the great endarkenment: 
on the future of philosophy*
Heather Douglas
Abstract: Elijah Millgram’s book The Great Endarkenment takes philosophy to task for 
failing to note the kinds of creatures we are (serial hyperspecializers) and what that means 
for philosophy. In this commentary, I will complicate the picture he draws, while suggest-
ing a more hopeful path forward. First, I argue that we are not actually serial hyperspecial-
izers. Nevertheless, we are hyperspecializers, and this is the main source of the looming 
endarkenment. I will suggest that a proper understanding of expertise, particularly the 
requirement that experts (at least experts whose success is not readily assessable) be re-
quired to explicate their judgments helps to mitigate the threat of siloed expertise and 
endarkenment. Further, I argue that grappling directly with the institutional structures 
that encourage narrow and isolated hyperspecialists in academia can be a way to avoid 
endarkenment problems. The current landscape of academia, with its valorization of nar-
row disciplinary expertise, is neither necessary nor sustainable. In order to change this 
landscape, we need to understand how current incentives construct epistemic niches, and 
what we might change in order to reshape the ecology of academia.
Keywords: Expertise; disciplinary specialization; endarkenment; engaged philosophy.
Statements of what is wrong with philosophy today, and how to fix it, are 
multiplying, and rightly so. There are so many problems to address, from a 
lack of diversity (philosophy departments do not reflect the ethnic and gender 
diversity of the general populations in which they are embedded), to admin-
istrative pressures (the closure of philosophy departments or the collapse of 
philosophy departments into other departments), to public intellectuals won-
dering aloud why we still have philosophy (e.g., Bill Nye, Neil deGrasse Tyson, 
Stephen Hawking), to scandals (need I say more). Philosophy is a discipline 
under siege on many fronts.
To fix what ails the field, different solutions have been proposed, from efforts 
to increase diversity (both in terms of current participants and authors taught to 
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students), to efforts to change what philosophers take their jobs to be (e.g., calls 
for more public philosophy), to efforts to shift what philosophers at the heart of 
their work understand themselves to be doing.1 In the midst of this cacophony 
of cures, Elijah Millgram’s book provides a distinctively metaphysical analysis 
of what ails philosophy (in particular, analytic philosophy, the dominant mode 
in North America). Millgram argues that philosophers have gotten wrong what 
human beings are as epistemic, moral, and political agents. As a result of this 
widespread misunderstanding, philosophers deliver work that is seriously mis-
guided and/or irrelevant to the human beings who actually exist. 
Rather than rational, autonomous actors whose preferences and knowledge 
are self-transparent and readily shareable through reason giving and argu-
ment, Millgram thinks we are an entirely different kind of creature. According 
to Millgram, humans (at least recent humans) are specialists, indeed hyperspe-
cialists. Further, humans change their specializations as needed, and thus are 
serial hyperspecializers. This means that people specialize in a particular area, 
do that work for a while, and then, either because they become bored or obso-
lete, switch areas. Millgram argues that hyperspecialists can barely understand 
each other, and that much of what philosophers have mistaken for philosophi-
cal necessity is simply the result of the desperate need for at least partial com-
munication across different specialties.
Millgram articulates this view from various starting points throughout the 
book, arguing that what analytic philosophy has focused on over the past half 
century (at least) has been misguided as a result – that, in short, the projects 
of metaphysics, metaethics, moral theory, and practical reasoning have been 
articulated for people whom we are not. Millgram calls for rethinking the proj-
ects of philosophy for the kinds of people we actually are.
In this commentary, I will take issue with some of Millgram’s starting 
points, while remaining in sympathy with much of what he has to say about 
how analytic philosophy has gone off the rails. I think his general diagnosis is 
on target, even if some of the details are not quite right. I also think the kinds 
of solutions explored by philosophers can and should be broadened – and that 
philosophers should not just think about the cognitive conditions of human 
thought, but also the institutional and contextual conditions (if you will, the 
ecological conditions), over which we have some influence. It is particularly 
through work on these that we can avoid the Great Endarkenment.
 1  A sampling of these efforts can be found in Dotson (2012), Kitcher (2011), Frodeman and 
Briggle (2016), Turri (2016) and in online forums such as https://feministphilosophers.wordpress.com.
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1. Are we serial hyperspecializers?
The first query I want to raise is whether we are the kinds of creatures Mill-
gram posits. Millgram notes (e.g., 98, n. 34) that his characterization of humans as 
serial hyperspecializers is “partial and idealized.” While there are some dramatic 
examples of serial hyperspecialization, I suspect lots of people (most?) do not 
shift careers substantially. (It is difficult to find data on this, as most data tracks 
job changes, which is different from career changes or specialization changes.) 
Certainly among academics (a tiny subset of the general population), few 
are serial hyperspecializers. There are small shifts of focus within an academic 
career, but these are not the sort of strong changes Millgram holds up as ex-
emplary of serial hyperspecializers. Academia has become structured in such a 
way that the topic of someone’s dissertation usually needs to become the core of 
their research program for the next six years after the completion of their Ph.D. 
if they are to be tenurable (assuming they land a tenure-track job, an increas-
ingly difficult task). If they get tenure, they have been establishing themselves 
in a particular area for nearly a decade, and it then becomes quite difficult to 
move substantially outside of their area of specialization. All that sunk cost of 
developing and defending positions is not easy to leave behind. (For example, 
one keeps getting requests to give talks or review work in one’s area of special-
ization, drawing one back to the debate in which one’s expertise is most potent.) 
Not many philosophers of science become ethicists or political theorists and 
vice versa. And that is all within philosophy. Much fewer change the field they 
work in dramatically (moving, e.g., from history to biochemistry), much less give 
up tenured jobs to try something else entirely, leaving academia.2 In general, it is 
hard to shift one’s specialization dramatically, much less to give up the relative 
security of tenure. Even if we do make small shifts in our careers, our academic 
specializations shape much of how we think about and do things. This is partly 
because of the way in which institutional incentives are structured to make con-
tinuing with what you have been doing the path of least resistance.
Beyond the walls of academia, I suspect that the kind of radical career changes 
Millgram notes are rare and resisted, even if job changes are common. Think, for 
example, of the social resistance one sees among coal miners to the suggestion 
of job retraining. Changing who you work for is not what Millgram is talking 
about; it is rather changing what you do. For many, this would require changing 
what they are. This, I suspect, is not something many do. Programmers continue 
 2  I know of one example of someone leaving a tenured position altogether – Alice Dreger – and 
she is a historian of science and still publishing in her field, which is hardly serial hyperspecialization. 
See Dreger (2016).
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to work on programming, even if they shift to managing other programmers. 
Human resource specialists get hired to do human resources, even if they change 
companies. (At least, this is the case for most people I talk to – admittedly anec-
dotal.) But it is not clear how important it is for Millgram’s argument that we be 
serial hyperspecialists. The fact of hyperspecialization alone is enough of a chal-
lenge. Even if we rarely change our specializations, how do we talk across them? 
How do we share knowledge and expertise in the complex projects that require 
coordination, i.e., most large projects in contemporary society?
2. Can hyperspecializers talk to each other?
Even if we are not such potent and pervasive serial hyperspecializers, the 
fact of hyperspecialization does indeed seem to characterize human endeav-
ors in the 21st century. So even if we do not change our specializations all 
that much, the fact of specialization still makes things complicated for our 
conception of human beings that runs underneath most of philosophy. And 
such specialization does pose difficulties for the Enlightenment project. The 
ideal of the educated (hu)man is no longer a generic ideal. There is no possible 
way anyone could read everything worth reading over their lifetime, much 
less in their youth. Encyclopedias are no longer portable in printed form, but 
are at their best as sprawling virtual repositories. Our store of knowledge has 
exploded in size over the past 200 years. Education, while having some general 
goals (various kinds of literacy and critical thinking) is aimed at specializa-
tion, so that we must ask what one is educated in or for. How are all these 
hyperspecialists supposed to talk to each other, much less work together, on 
the complex projects upon which our civilization depends? And how are we to 
evaluate the other specialists, outside of our own areas of expertise, to decide 
with whom to work? 
Evaluating and using specialized expertise is a central 21st century philo-
sophical problem. Reliance on expertise grew in the previous century, even 
as expertise itself became more specialized. The expansion of advisory sys-
tems in bureaucratic governments over the past century is one symptom of 
this (Douglas 2009: ch. 2). No longer can an agency, much less an individual, 
rely upon one advisor. Entire committees of advisors are needed, with often 
their own network of advisors underneath them. Webs of advisors, used to 
funnel expert judgment to decision-makers, have become the norm (with chief 
advisors coordinating the underlying network). Further, over the course of the 
20th century, the kind of decisions authorities (whether elected or appointed) 
needed to make increasingly depended on access to expertise (even if expert 
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judgment did not and does not determine what the right decision is). To make 
ill-informed decisions (whether on health policy, foreign policy, infrastructure 
policy, etc.) is to court failure, even if utilizing expertise does not guarantee 
success. And this is true as much for private businesses as it is for public gover-
nance. We are knowledge societies, and that knowledge is specialized.
Can we hyperspecializers talk to each other effectively, or is the only mean-
ingful discourse that which takes place within our specializations? Here I think 
the picture Millgram paints is too stark. It is true that our specializations, our 
domains of expertise, come with jargon and knowledge that makes the full na-
ture of expertise impossible to completely grasp for outsiders. Training to be-
come an expert (whether within or outside of academia) comes with learning 
to fluidly navigate a particular complex realm, to know where the pitfalls are 
(methodological, epistemological, practical), where expertise shades off into 
“here there be dragons” territory, and how to make judgments deploying one’s 
expertise in the face of the new. While outsiders can become fluent enough to 
talk with experts in their own language (what has been labelled “interactional 
expertise”), only full experts can function within the field of expertise, gener-
ating new knowledge in the field and deploying that knowledge properly (what 
has been labelled “contributory expertise”) (Collins et al 2007; Plaisance et al 
2014). The entrance fee for becoming even an interactional expert, much less a 
contributory expert, is high. 
We could all train up in some areas for interactional expertise to help bridge 
the specializations (and I suspect that many philosophers of science do this). 
But even so, the problems we need to address will evolve and the projects 
change, and developing the right sets of people with the needed specializations 
plus the useful interactional expertise is a tall order. What can we do?
The first thing is to take a step back and ask what grounds deference to 
expertise. Expertise is, in practice at least, a two-party relationship between 
an expert who has knowledge (or appropriately well-informed judgment) and 
someone who is a non-expert, unable to grapple with the complexity that the 
expert can. We can point to social and institutional markers of what makes 
someone an expert (they have the right kind of degrees from the right kind 
of institutions, they publish in the right kind of places), but these are not suf-
ficient. We can all think of people who have these markers and yet are not 
very trustworthy in their judgments within their field. And we can all think 
of failures among these institutions in the past, where our institutions have 
validated whole fields that in retrospect were not worthy of respect, much less 
reliance and trust. The institutional markers can be granted without trustwor-
thy expertise. So while such social epistemological indicators can be helpful, 
they are not sufficient. 
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Beyond such flawed institutional makers, how do we assess individual 
experts? It is helpful here to recognize that expertise falls along a spectrum, 
from expertise that is readily assessable by non-experts through looking at 
raw success, to expertise that can be at least partially assessed by raw suc-
cess, to expertise that cannot be assessed by raw success in any practical 
framework. The first kind of expertise is exemplified by a central focus of 
philosophers of expertise – chess masters.3 These are experts who we can 
readily assess, because the experts are ones who win the matches. We don’t 
have to debate who is worthy of the name of expert here, because anyone 
can tell. If they win matches, they have the expertise. And telling who wins 
matches is a well demarcated activity requiring little judgment and no ex-
pertise in the activity itself.
But this is not a very interesting kind of expertise for thinking about the 
challenge of the Great Endarkenment. Winning chess matches (or any kind 
of game) is not going to help us grapple with the kinds of complex prob-
lems society faces. There are readily assessable experts of this sort, however, 
outside of games. Think of car mechanics (does the car run better or not?) 
or dentists (does the tooth stop hurting or not?) as roughly similar kinds of 
experts. Admittedly in these more applicable cases, confounders can mess 
up assessment. But we can usually assess the expertise of our car mechan-
ics and dentists based on relatively short runs of success (or failure). Fur-
ther along the spectrum, the range of plausible confounders increases or 
the time frames for assessing expertise increase (or both). When we reach 
the other end of the spectrum, we confront the expertise most contested in 
today’s societal debates: e.g., climate scientists, epidemiologists, toxicolo-
gists, ecologists. These are experts grappling with complex systems (lots of 
confounders, hard to isolate) where it can be difficult to show in the near 
term (or even the medium term) that interventions in the world based on 
their expertise are successful. Raw success that is easy to see is not going to 
be a helpful criterion in these cases.
For these experts (and to some extent for experts in the middle range as 
well), we need something other than raw success to assess expertise. I think 
we should expect of these experts that they be able to explain their judg-
ments to non-experts. Experts cannot be expected to lay out all the evidence 
and reasons for why they think what they think, but they need to be able to 
say something about why they think what they think. And if pressed for fur-
ther details or explanations for why they reject some views in favor of others, 
they must be able to explain that too. Indeed, it is the fluency of judgment in 
 3  See, e.g., Dreyfus’s essay in Selinger et al (2005) and Selinger (2011).
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the face of the complexity in their area of work that makes them an expert. 
As Julia Annas has written:
[E]xpertise requires that the expert, unlike the mere muddler or the person with 
the unintellectual knack, be able to ‘give an account’ (logon didonai) of what it is that 
she is an expert in. The expert, but not the dabbler, can explain why she is doing what 
she is doing; instead of being stuck with inarticulacy, or being reduced to saying that 
‘it feels right this way,’ she can explain why this is, here and now, the appropriate thing 
to do in these circumstances. (Annas 2001) 
In cases where expertise is not readily assessable on the basis of success, 
such accounts must be on offer. For these cases, such fluency must be on dis-
play for an individual to count as an expert. 
Learning to explain one’s judgments to non-experts takes work. Learning to 
talk about one’s work without the comfortable cloak of disciplinary jargon and 
presumed shared bases of assumptions with one’s expert peers is difficult and 
challenging, but that does not mean it cannot be done. Further, among aca-
demics, we already do some of this work in teaching our undergraduate cours-
es. But it is the kind of work that does not get recognized much within our 
academic lives. It forces one to think about the most important lines of infer-
ence, and to find succinct and elegant ways to explain key points. In doing so, 
it often cleans up one’s own lines of thought. Done well, such accounts display 
a glimpse of the complexity with which experts grapple, further justifying the 
expertise. Rather than such explications making it seem as if anyone could do 
their job, explications of expert judgment do the opposite – they make it clear 
why expertise is so desperately needed. Whenever I talk with people who have 
expertise, I usually come away with the deep awareness of how little I know 
about their area, increasing my sense of the importance of their expertise.
I suspect that the legitimate experts who gain traction in today’s world are 
people who can do this explication well.4 I also suspect that the fact that we are 
not all that often serial hyperspecializers makes explication of judgment easier to 
achieve, given the work involved for the expert in explaining their judgments to 
nonexperts. Thinking about expertise in this way helps to keep us from falling 
fully into the Great Endarkenment trap. Even in a world of hyperspecializers, 
experts can talk beyond their specialization – and we should both support and 
require such efforts of experts. Doing so is essential to the trust in, and uptake 
 4  There are lots of pseudo-experts (talking heads) who gain traction by spewing easily digestible 
bullshit (in the technical sense of bullshit – see Frankfurt (2005) Hardcastle et al (2006)). How to tell 
pseudo-experts who talk a good game from real experts is beyond the scope of this essay. I think it 
has much to do with detecting who has integrity, i.e. who can respond to criticism and new evidence 
(Douglas 2014). But this point aside, we should still ask experts to explain their judgments to us. 
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of, their expertise. The question remains, though, whether our institutions will 
help or hinder the Enlightenment struggle against Endarkenment and whether 
we can salvage the Enlightenment project from the threat of Endarkenment.
3. The cognitive and the “ecological”
It is here that I recommend a shift in perspective for Millgram’s work. Mill-
gram writes as if being serial hyperspecialists is just what we are, as if this is an 
unavoidable fate that has befallen us, a result of the pursuit of knowledge en-
gendered by the Enlightenment. I do not agree with the necessity. Perhaps we 
have, either intentionally or unwittingly, created the kind of creature Millgram 
describes (at least the hyperspecialist part), but this is partly contingent on the 
way our academic culture and broader societal culture has developed. And 
this means there is nothing necessary about us being hyperspecialists unable 
to communicate across specializations. I have already argued that part of what 
grounds expertise should be an ability to explicate one’s expert judgments 
(particularly for expertise not readily assessable in terms of success). We can 
further see that supporting this view institutionally will require incentivizing 
and rewarding the work this entails. 
That culture both matters and is malleable can be seen in the fact that cur-
rently academia is an environment that encourages us to hyperspecialize while 
discouraging the serial part of Millgram’s description (as I noted above). Given 
that it is hyperspecialization that is the real challenge before us, can we design 
institutions to encourage us to be specialists that can share expertise across 
specializations, that are good at explaining the basis of our judgments to the 
nonspecialist? Are there institutional structures that, rather than encouraging 
disciplinary isolation, can craft bridges across them? In short, can we be the 
kinds of creatures we would like to be, or that we need to be to make key cul-
tural projects like the pursuit of science within democracies work?
Millgram is not blind to these issues of institutional incentives and “ecolo-
gies” (read metaphorically as epistemic niches shaped by context), and he takes 
note of them (e.g., in chapter 11). But he does not focus on them. If he included 
them more centrally, if he saw them as both contingent and amenable to ex-
perimental change, his story might be different.
Robert Frodeman’s recent monograph on what ails philosophy focuses on the 
ecological aspects of knowledge production. In Sustainable Knowledge, Frode-
man argues that the institutional cues for academics have seriously misaligned 
our knowledge production practices (Frodeman 2013). In other words, the ecol-
ogy of our knowledge production system is all wrong. Frodeman describes the 
 RESISTING THE GREAT ENDARKENMENT: ON THE FUTURE OF PHILOSOPHY 101
fundamental unsustainability of the current system, which encourages ever nar-
rower specializations, ever narrower dissertations, and more insular research 
projects. Further, such a research agenda depends on an ever expanding gradu-
ate student workforce, despite the fact that such graduate students cannot be 
placed in the academic careers which they hope for, as academia is no longer 
expanding at a rate that can handle the narrowing of specialization and its con-
comitant growing workforce. (Narrowing of specialty requires an expansion 
of the overall knowledge-production workforce just to cover all the resulting 
territory.) The current academic system depends on a rate of growth that simply 
cannot be accommodated, particularly as we stabilize global population. Focus-
ing on philosophy as but one academic discipline to which this worry applies, 
Frodeman argues for the pursuit of “field philosophy,” for philosophers getting 
out there and engaging with nonphilosophers. (See also Frodeman et al (2016).) 
Such engagement, Frodeman hopes, will ground philosophical concerns in the 
real world, simultaneously demonstrating the value of philosophy and prevent-
ing philosophers from pursuing the kind of arcane exercises they sometimes 
find so attractive. Not all hyperspecializations are worth keeping, and an ag-
gressive pruning of the discipline is needed.
I suspect there is much in this view with which Millgram would sympa-
thize. Millgram chastises philosophers who not only ignore problems in the 
“real world” but view it as a demotion to work on them, as if some sort of 
class stigma associated itself with doing philosophy that might be relevant and 
interesting to someone outside of philosophy. That we have such stigmas in 
philosophy is indicative of a perverse incentive system, of a distorted set of 
niches. What should be stigmatized is philosophical work that cannot gain 
any purchase on the interests of non-philosophers. As Dennett warned in his 
incisive essay, “Higher-order truths about chmess,” philosophers should be 
worried about projects that they cannot convince people outside of philosophy 
to care about. 5 (Dennett 2006) The worry should be that such projects are idle 
navel gazing that will produce little of lasting value. Just because a problem is 
hard or intricate does not mean it is worth doing. Philosophers sometimes fall 
for the allure of abstraction, thinking that more abstract work is always more 
fundamental. Without grounding outside of philosophy, it is often just more 
insular and more irrelevant. Philip Kitcher has also noticed this problem: “The 
 5  In addition, Dennett argued that one test for one’s expertise (particularly for the selection of 
one’s projects) is to “try to teach the stuff to uninitiated undergraduates. If they don’t ‘get it,’ you 
should really consider the hypothesis that you’re following a self-supporting community of experts 
into an artefactual trap” (Dennett 2006: 40). If experts cannot teach even captive undergraduates to 
“get it” (and this is not imbuing students with expertise, just familiarizing them with it), we should be 
really dubious about the presence of valuable expertise.
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danger that a field of inquiry will become a ‘sentimental indulgence for a few’ 
– or perhaps a site of intellectual jousting for a few – is especially urgent in the 
case of philosophy.” (Kitcher 2011: 250, in part quoting Dewey) But this is a 
cultural and institutional problem, not a cognitive problem. 
The ecology of academia matters here. Professors don’t have to impress anyone 
but their peers to get jobs, tenure, and promotion. There is something valuable 
about the protection this affords. We need academia to remain a place where 
people can take intellectual risks, exercise academic freedom, and pursue proj-
ects that can take a decade or two to reach fruition, well outside the time frames 
of the political and the capitalist systems. But having philosophers do philoso-
phy solely for other philosophers is a mistake, one that undermines the value of 
philosophy itself. We can engage and encourage challenging long-term projects 
without the valorization of work that is only of interest within the specialty. 
There are real problems generated outside philosophy that philosophers can 
address, indeed that they have the most appropriate tools to address, in our con-
temporary vexed state. Here is a sampler: autonomous killing machines, dual-
use research, identity politics, privacy, citizenship in a global world, happiness. 
These are all areas where the particular empirical details are shot through with 
complex normative ideas, some barely formed, some interacting in complex 
ways, and we need desperately to know not just what but how to think about 
them. The world of our making is moving so fast we need the conceptual tools 
to keep up with it. Philosophers are good at making conceptual tools.
Conceptual work of this sort cannot be a priori. Knowing the a posteriori 
details is central to any of these projects. Nor can it just be left to social and 
natural scientists to describe (as best they can) what is happening. We need 
philosophers to help see how we should think about these things, an agenda 
entangled deeply with a sense of what is good about being human and the 
complex normative terrains we traverse, while those things shift underneath 
our feet. Neurath was right: we are always on the boat while we try to recon-
struct it. But the boat is not just a descriptive account of the world. It is also 
simultaneously a normative account. 
Grappling with these entangled descriptive-normative realities might seem 
obvious work for the philosopher. But the ecology of academia pushes the 
other way. Philosophers who ignore the world and hyperspecialize do better 
(as Millgram notes) at professional promotion. It is also just so much easier to 
do solely internal disciplinary work and to evaluate such work. And it is easier 
to just talk to philosophers, to immerse oneself in the jargon and shared as-
sumptions that shape our work. It is just not adequate to do so. Expertise, to 
be valuable, must be assessable in some way. Either expertise can demonstrate 
its value through raw success (an unlikely avenue for philosophers, but I will 
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not categorically exclude it) or through explaining the basis of judgment to 
non-experts. We should expect ourselves to do this, to have one eye always 
towards non-philosophers and whether what we do can be explicated to them, 
and further to be found helpful and illuminating by them. 
We can keep the academic freedom needed to pursue risky projects and 
to protect philosophy from becoming a mere tool of the current corporate-
capitalist power structure. Some insulation from the predominant powers is 
needed, if philosophy is to properly utilize its critical and explicative capacities. 
But there is nothing necessary about the isolation of philosophy from general 
societal concerns and there is nothing good about valorizing the esoteric and 
apparently useless. 
In short, Millgram should be a bit more ecological and institutional in his 
thinking, a bit less focused on our cognitive design. How to change the ecol-
ogy (to put the right incentives in place) for philosophy is the central challenge 
for the discipline. 
4. Conclusion: forging a path
Millgram and Frodeman are both correct in their assessment of philosophy 
as fostering ever more specialist discussions, usually solely among other phi-
losophers. All the institutional cues are channeling our practices in this direc-
tion. Frodeman’s arguments for de-disciplining philosophy, however, ignore 
too much the social epistemological value of specialization.6 There is some-
thing good to be gained from specialists who work out complex problems in 
conversation with each other, from the mutual criticism that such focused con-
versations can engender. The problem occurs when the value and assessment 
of such work remains based solely on those insider debates, and the grounding 
in the world, and the interaction with nonphilosophers to check on the direc-
tion of the work, is lost.
So how do we capture the best of philosophy and jettison the worst? We 
need philosophers to work with people outside of the discipline – to talk to 
them, to see where the conceptual issues are in the world and in other fields, 
and to field test our conceptual work, to see when the distinctions we obsess 
over are in fact useful distinctions for living. We also need philosophers to 
continue to talk to each other, to use the discipline of specialized expertise to 
hone and craft the concepts and arguments with which we work. We need to 
 6  In private communication, Frodeman does espouse the value of disciplinary philosophy as a 
source of insights for the broader world, as a place of training for students, and as a place for recharg-
ing the batteries of philosophers. 
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embrace the productive tension this will produce, where we are both special-
ized and boundary crossing, and we need to design our institutions to foster 
this kind of existence.
How might we do that? Let’s consider both negative and positive sides of 
the coin, pushes and pulls in our academic culture. 
1) We should not accept internal disciplinary intricacy as a 
good excuse if a philosopher can’t explain why their work 
might be interesting or valuable. If they can’t give an ac-
count of their work’s value, there is good reason to suspect 
there is not much there of value. The push in grant propos-
als and book proposals to say in a page to a nonspecialist 
what the project is and why it is important reflects this. And 
it is a fine exercise to demand. Further efforts, like three-
minute theses competitions, require philosophers to hone 
what they want to say to general audiences. We should sup-
port these efforts and see them as central to good work as 
internal peer review.
2) We should not weight disciplinary journals and conferences 
over interdisciplinary ones. Just because cross-disciplinary 
standards are impossible to articulate does not mean seri-
ously valuable intellectual work does not take place in in-
terdisciplinary fora. In many ways, because one must both 
explain one’s work to those outside of one’s specialization 
in these fora and be aware of the nature of one’s specializa-
tion, such work is crucial to building awareness both of the 
nature of one’s own discipline (and its limits) and of what 
is going on elsewhere. There is challenging, good work at 
these interfaces, and academic departments need to explic-
itly value it as much as disciplinary work.
3) In shaping research projects, philosophers should not just 
talk to other philosophers. Yes, it is more work to talk to 
non-philosophers. But philosophers have no idea whether 
the distinctions they are making are doing any useful work 
if they only talk to each other. People who are actually go-
ing to use the distinctions, and the conceptual tools that 
come with them, need to try them out. This is the ultimate 
test for philosophy, in the field outside of the discipline (just 
as Frodeman would have it). We have to field test our work, 
as awkward and difficult as that might be, to get a sense 
of whether we are on the right track. This too is already 
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being written into grant requirements, demanding dissemi-
nation beyond disciplinary boundaries. But more than just 
publishing beyond academic journals needs to happen. We 
have to get better at trying our conceptual work out in on-
going interaction with those who may use it. This is the big 
institutional challenge before us, and experimenting with 
institutional forms and evaluations for doing this should be 
tackled next.
That is a start. Hopefully, these ideas will get tested, and refined (or com-
pletely reworked) in the coming years, and philosophy will not just continue its 
navel gazing path into oblivion. It has the potential to be too powerful and too 
central for us to accept such a fate. In pursuing this agenda, we can change the 
ecology of academia, and perhaps save ourselves from Endarkenment.
Heather Douglas
heather.douglas@uwaterloo.ca
University of Waterloo/Michigan State University
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